Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 1

Article 3

Ancillary Orders of Compulsory Licensing and
Their Compatibility with the TRIPS Agreement
Richard Li-dar Wang

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Richard Li-dar Wang, Ancillary Orders of Compulsory Licensing and Their Compatibility with the TRIPS Agreement, 18 Marq. Intellectual
Property L. Rev. 87 (2014).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr/vol18/iss1/3

This Intellectual Property Policy Forum Articles is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

WANG FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2/26/2014 7:05 PM

ANCILLARY ORDERS OF COMPULSORY
LICENSING AND THEIR COMPATIBILITY
WITH THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
RICHARD LI-DAR WANG*
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 91
II. CONDITIONS FOR COMPULSORY LICENSING TO BE EFFECTIVE ......... 92
III. ANCILLARY ORDERS TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
COMPULSORY LICENSING ............................................................ 95
A. Know-How Transfer Orders .................................................. 96
B. Goal-Attainment Ensuring Orders ......................................... 97
IV. SIDE-EFFECTS PREVENTING ORDERS............................................... 97
V. TRIPS-COMPATIBILITY OF ANCILLARY ORDERS ............................. 99
A. Know-How Transfer Orders .................................................. 99
B. Local Manufacturing Orders ................................................ 101
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS ................................................................ 105

* Associate Professor of Law, National Chiao Tung University (Hsinchu, Taiwan); S.J.D.
2007, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. The draft of this paper was presented in the Fifth
Conference on European and Asian Intellectual Property, Dec. 3–5, 2012, and the Symposium on
International Trade, Technology and Business Law, June 14, 2013, both held in Taipei, Taiwan. The
author would like to thank Professor Byungil Kim, Mark Janis, Michael Mattioli, Donald Knebel for
their invaluable views and comments, and Justice Chang-Fa Lo, Professor Kung-Chung Liu and Bryan
Mercurio for their insightful suggestions. All shortcomings of this paper, if any, should still be
attributed to the author.

WANG FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

88

2/26/2014 7:05 PM

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

[Vol. 18:1

WANG FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

2/26/2014 7:05 PM

ANCILLARY ORDERS OF COMPULSORY LICENSING

89

RICHARD LI-DAR WANG

Richard Li-dar Wang is Associate Professor at the Institute of Technology
Law, National Chiao Tung University in Hsinchu, Taiwan. He is an affiliated
faculty member in the Center for Intellectual Property Research, Indiana
University Maurer School of Law. Wang accomplished his S.J.D. degree in
Indiana–Maurer in 2007, and is also a graduate of Georgetown Law Center
(LL.M. 2004) and National Taiwan University (LL.B, LL.M). Wang’s
academic interests lie primarily in the fields of patent law and antitrust law. He
teaches information law and telecommunications law as well. He is a frequent
presenter in major IP law conferences, such as the Intellectual Property
Scholars Conference (IPSC), and contributes intensively to leading U.S. law
reviews. In 2013, he was invited to present at the 23rd Anniversary
International Conference of the Korea Legislation Research Institute (KLRI), a
government-funded organization specializing in legislation research. Before
joining academia, Wang worked at the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission. He
investigated anticompetitive acts in the petroleum and pharmaceutical sectors
and unfair business practices across industries. He later became a consultant to
the Vice Chairperson of the Commission, advising him on legal and policy
matters. Selected publication that represent current research interests are: (1)
Patent Protection of Pharmacologically Active Metabolites: Theoretical and
Technological Analysis on the Jurisprudence of Four Regions, 29 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 489 (2013) (with
Pei-Chen Huang); (2) Deviated, Unsound, and Self-Retreating: A Critical
Assessment of Princo v. ITC en banc Decision, 16 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW REVIEW 51 (2012); (3) Biomedical Upstream Patenting and
Scientific Research: A Case for Compulsory Licensing Bearing Reach-Through
Royalties, 10 YALE JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 251 (2008).

WANG FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

90

2/26/2014 7:05 PM

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

[Vol. 18:1

WANG FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

2/26/2014 7:05 PM

ANCILLARY ORDERS OF COMPULSORY LICENSING

91

I. INTRODUCTION
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the key
international conventions in the field of intellectual property (IP). It is the first
international treaty that lays down the mandatory minimum standard of patent
protection for nations across the world. Given the comprehensive coverage of
WTO membership,1 the TRIPS Agreement has effectively established an
international standard for IP protection in member states. With respect to
copyright and patents, this Agreement expressly allows for compulsory licenses
to be granted by competent authorities, with an aim to facilitate an adjusting
mechanism to balance IP protection, on the one hand, and social or economic
policy goals in general, on the other.2
Specifically, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement authorizes WTO members
to issue compulsory licenses on patents to address national emergencies,
extreme urgency, or other socioeconomic issues arising at the domestic level,
subject to the procedures and limitations stipulated in the same article.3
Through Article 9.1, one of the incorporation clauses in the TRIPS Agreement,
the compulsory license scheme as to the author’s translation and reproduction
rights for developing countries, as provided in the Appendix of the Berne
Convention (1971), essentially merges into and becomes an integral part of the
TRIPS Agreement. This involuntary license regime affords developing
countries leeway to adapt the level of copyright protection to address local
economic, social, or cultural needs.4
In light of the important role that compulsory licensing could play in
contemporary IP systems, the WTO reaffirms the members’ right to grant such
licenses in the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted
in November 2001 at the Doha Ministerial Conference (Doha Declaration).5
One of the main themes in the Doha Declaration is that patent protection should
be implemented in a manner that permits WTO members to protect public
1. As of November 25, 2013, the WTO has 159 members.
2. See, e.g., CARLOS M CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 242–43 (2000); ANA
MARIA PACÓN, What Will TRIPs Do for Developing Countries?, FROM GATT TO TRIPS—THE
AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 339–40 (FriedrichKarl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 319 (2001).
3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31, prem. & ¶ (a)–
(c), Apr. 15, 1994.
4. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works app. art. I, ¶ (1), July 24,
1971.
5. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, ¶ 5(b).
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health and to promote access for the general public to essential medicines. For
that purpose, WTO members may use, to the full extent, the flexibilities as set
forth in Articles 30 and 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.6
Following the guidance of the Doha Declaration, WTO members have
made use of the compulsory license scheme to address their domestic issues,
particularly in meeting the demands of public health. For instance, Brazil,7
India,8 Taiwan,9 and Thailand10 have issued compulsory licenses on
pharmaceuticals essential for treating deadly diseases in recent years. Even so,
relative to the large number of patents now in effect for WTO members, the
frequency and number of compulsory licenses to date have been low.11
II. CONDITIONS FOR COMPULSORY LICENSING TO BE EFFECTIVE
The compulsory license does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, the success of
a compulsory licensing regime depends on the industrial and technological
contexts that the licensee encounters. For a compulsory license to be effective,
a number of conditions must be present. First of all, licensees with sufficient
capacities are indispensable.12 The lack of technical sophistication and ability
to learn has been a significant detriment to technological transfer in developing

6. Id. at ¶ 4.
7. Brazil issued a compulsory license against Merck & Co. for its HIV/AIDS drug, Efavirenz,
in May 2007. Riadh Quadir, Patent Stalemate? The WTO’s Essential Medicines Impasse Between
Pharmas and Least Developed Countries, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 437, 459–60 (2009).
8. On March 9, 2012, the Indian patent authority granted generics manufacturer Natco Pharma
Ltd. the right to produce and sell Bayer’s Sorafenib, a patented medicine that is useful in treating liver
and kidney cancers at an advanced stage. Enrico Bonadio, Comment, Compulsory Licensing of
Patents: The Bayer/Natco Case, 34 EUR. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 719, 719 (2012).
9. In the wake of the avian flu crisis, Tamiflu was considered an effective remedy for the H5N1
virus. Failing to secure sufficient supply from F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., the Taiwanese Government
granted a compulsory license on Tamiflu in December 2005. See Kung-Chung Liu, Rationalising the
Regime of Compulsory Patent Licensing by the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL.
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 757, 760 n.12 (2008); Eileen M. Kane, Achieving Clinical Equality in an
Influenza Pandemic: Patent Realities, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1137, 1167 (2009).
10. Thailand granted a couple of compulsory licenses in 2006 and 2007, including the patented
HIV/AIDS drugs Efavirenz (from Merck) and Kaletra (from Abbott), and Plavix, which is used for
treating heart disease. Kristen Osenga, Get The Balance Right!: Squaring Access with Patent
Protection, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 309, 319–20 (2012).
11. See Kung-Chung Liu, The Need and Justification for a General Competition-Oriented
Compulsory Licensing Regime, 43 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 679, 681 (2012);
Getachew Mengistie, The Patent System in Africa: Its Contribution and Potential in Stimulating
Innovation, Technology Transfer and Fostering Science and Technology: Part 2, 16 INT’L TRADE L.
& REG. 175, 178 (2010).
12. Mengistie, supra note 11, at 178; Richard Li-dar Wang, 從 TRIPS
協定與公眾健康爭議論專利強制授權之功能與侷限 [Functions and Restraints of Compulsory
Licensing: Perspective from TRIPS Agreement and Public Health], 1 TECH. L. REV. 215, 235–36
(2004) (Taiwan).
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countries.13 Existing manufacturing capacity also matters with respect to the
quantity and speed at which the compulsory licensee could put the patented
technology or copyrighted work into production. The more qualified capacity
that is in place, the faster the licensed IP can come into mass production and
fulfill the underlying goal of individual compulsory licenses—whether it is
working the technology locally, treating a public health crisis, disseminating
advanced knowledge and fostering higher education, or any other social or
cultural need.
Notably, the required capacity is not limited to those located within the
issuing country. If the scope of the compulsory license includes importation,
the issuing government could utilize competent manufacturers located overseas
to exploit the licensed IP and produce targeted products to fulfill domestic
needs. This practice is allowable under the TRIPS Agreement. No provision
in the same Agreement stipulates against non-voluntary import licenses. The
key is that the expected foreign supplier must have the right to produce in its
own country, and be able to legitimately export the products at issue. There are
a couple of situations where those conditions will be met and it is entirely lawful
to practice the subject matter and export the product there: when the term of the
intellectual property protection covering the licensed subject matter has
expired, or when no pertinent IP protection has been secured in the specific
foreign country. Supply from abroad may also be possible when a compulsory
license is in place in the exporting country. However, Article 31(f) of the
TRIPS Agreement requires that each of the non-voluntary licenses be granted
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market, which does not prohibit
the licensee from exporting the product so long as the exportation constitutes a
minor portion of the total production.14
Under the Guidance of the Doha Declaration, the WTO General Council
established a waiver system in 2003 to soften the ban on production
predominantly for exportation.15 Under the waiver system, compulsory
licenses predominantly for exports are permitted, with the condition that the
importing WTO member has no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, grants
such a waiver, and notifies the WTO Secretariat.16 In December 2005, the
General Council of the WTO formalized the waiver system, adding Article
31bis to the TRIPS Agreement.17 This amendment is now waiting to take
13. Mengistie, supra note 11, at 179.
14. WATAL, supra note 2, at 325.
15. Decision of the General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health Decision, WT/L/540 and Corr.1 (Sept. 1, 2003), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm.
16. Id. ¶ 2.(a).
17. Decision of the General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8,
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effect.18 This waiver system, however, is limited to exporting pharmaceuticals
to WTO members, and to date only Rwanda has filed one request for
importation.19
Historically, a number of governments have authorized importation of
generic pharmaceuticals to address domestic health problems.20 For instance,
the government of Ecuador granted a compulsory license in 2010 on Ritonavir,
an antiretroviral drug, to the local distributor of Cipla, an Indian company
producing a generic version of the same drug.21 Moreover, in the case of
Efavirenz in Brazil, before local manufacturers could successfully provide this
antiretroviral medicine, the Brazilian government included importation in the
compulsory license and counted on several Indian generic producers to supply
the medicine at a lower price.22
The second critical condition is the size of the market, which is a decisive
factor for the sales revenue that a licensee may reasonably anticipate from
practicing the patent or copyright. The potential magnitude of the market
closely relates to whether the licensee would recover the necessary cost for
employing the IP, benefit from economy of scale, or even make a profit.23 If
the market size is narrowly restrained and only a very limited amount of
revenue could be generated from the compulsory license, even manufacturers
or publishers with adequate capacity to practice the patent or copyright may
stay away from taking it.
In calculating the size of a potential market for compulsory licenses, the
basis for assessment in most cases would still be confined by the boundaries of
the issuing country. Foreign markets are highly uncertain. The patent status of
2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm.
18. As of now about 70 WTO members have issued notification that they accept this
amendment. Since less than two-thirds of the WTO members have formally accepted the amendment,
Article 31bis has not yet taken effect and replaced the 2003 waiver. The deadline for WTO members
to accept this revision has been extended to December 31, 2013. Decision of the General Council,
Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement – Third Extension of the Period for the Acceptance by Members
of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/829 (Dec. 5, 2011).
19. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification Under
Paragraph 2(a) of the Decision of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/N/9/RWA/1 (July 19, 2007).
20. See supra notes 7–10.
21. Leaked Cables Show U.S. Tried, Failed to Organize Against Ecuador Compulsory
Licensing, PUBLIC CITIZEN BLOG (May 10, 2011), http://www.citizen.org/leaked-cables-show-UStried-failed-to-organize-against-ecuador-compulsory-licensing.
22. Keith Alcorn, Brazil Issues Compulsory License on Efavirenz, NAM (May 7, 2007),
http://www.aidsmap.com/Brazil-issues-compulsory-license-on-efavirenz/page/1427206/.
See
generally Quadir, supra note 7 (explaining Brazil’s compulsory license on Efavirenz).
23. Mengistie, supra note 11, at 178; Stacey B. Lee, Can Incentives to Generic Manufacturers
Save the Doha Declaration’s Paragraph 6?, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1387, 1413 (2013); Wang, supra note
11, at 236.
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the targeted products in foreign countries determines whether they could be
produced or imported freely in those countries, whether a compulsory license
for importation will be imposed, and whether those countries would utilize the
waiver system to lift the limitation of Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement.
Though there might be opportunities for the licensees to export part of their
production to countries granting compulsory licenses on importation of the
same products, the chances are quite uncertain, and it may seem remote for
potential candidates that are considering whether to take the compulsory license
or not. As a result, countries that have only small populations or weak buying
power will suffer from the constraint of market size,24 and the function of
compulsory licenses would be seriously curtailed.
A third precondition for an effective compulsory license concerns
necessary know-how.25 The patent law surely requires public disclosure of the
claimed technology to enable persons skilled in the art to carry out the invention
themselves,26 but occasionally additional know-how is still necessary for them
to put the claimed invention into industrial application on a commercial scale.
IP licensing agreements, however, typically do not contain obligations
regarding technical assistance or technology transfer from the IP owner.
In the scenario of compulsory licensing, it is implausible to expect rightholders to voluntarily provide any technical guidance to the licensee. If the
licensee does not possess all the skills that are critical for practicing the licensed
IP—such as the know-how on commercialization, improving the
manufacturing process, optimizing the yield rate, etc.27—she will still be unable
to duplicate the product of the right-holder successfully. When this situation
arises, the compulsory license may not work as effectively as expected.
III. ANCILLARY ORDERS TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPULSORY
LICENSING
If countries fall short of the essential conditions as set forth above,
necessary measures should be taken to make up for the deficiencies. The first
two conditions, however, are not so easy to restore. If competent licensees do
not exist, the government could only choose to step in and practice the patent
or copyright with its own facilities. Even so, the feasibility of this measure still
24. See HANNAH E. KETTLER & CHRIS COLLINS, USING INNOVATIVE ACTION TO MEET
GLOBAL HEALTH NEEDS THROUGH EXISTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIMES 12–39, available
at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/word/study_papers/sp2b_kettler_study.doc.
25. Mengistie, supra note 11, at 178; Wang, supra note 11, at 236–37.
26. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 29,
¶ 1 (“Members shall require that an applicant for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner
sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art . . . .”).
27. Wang, supra note 11, at 237.
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depends on the presence of production facilities and technical sophistication of
the country with regard to the licensed IP. Furthermore, factors affecting the
magnitude of the market, such as population and national income, are difficult
to change within a short period of time as well.
A. Know-How Transfer Orders
The only condition that concerned authorities might be able to create in
granting a compulsory license is the necessary know-how. Those authorities
could issue an ancillary order to require the right-holder to provide additional
know-how to the licensees.28 In order to ensure the transfer of the licensed
technologies, the order should obligate the right-holder to provide technical
assistance, and hand over technical documents that contain the know-how or
other technologies that the licensee identifies as necessary for implementing the
compulsory license. If the right-holder obeys the order and conveys
undisclosed know-how, the receiving licensee is obligated to maintain its
secrecy and pay reasonable royalties for using the know-how, just as a
voluntary trade secret licensee would.29
The licensee may encounter difficulties in identifying necessary know-how
for transfers, but she does not have to recite the know-how item by item.
Rather, the scope and content of the transfer order could be defined in
categories with reasonable particularity, just as attorneys do in requesting
opposing parties to produce documents or records in the discovery process of
civil litigation in the United States.30 In case of doubt, the granting authority of
the compulsory license should adjudicate the dispute through adequate
procedures, and determine the proper scope and content of the transfer. Where
conflicts arise concerning whether the licensee has abused their rights in the
know-how transfer and attained unreasonable advantages over the right-holder,
the granting agency or a court should have the authority to decide whether the
licensee is liable to pay compensation and refrain from further using a particular
know-how.
Since IP right-holders will undoubtedly tend to be reluctant to transfer
undisclosed know-how, other sources of such transfers should be secured to
facilitate the implementation of compulsory licenses. For that purpose, the
know-how transfer order could excuse persons that have access to the right28. Regrettably, the author has not found any national practice that adopts orders similar to
what the paper proposes here.
29. RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 7:3, § 17:16 (2013–
2014 ed. 2013).
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(A) (“The request [to produce any designated documents or
electronically stored information] must describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of
items to be inspected . . . .”).
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holder’s technical information or materials from their obligations under any
existing non-disclosure agreement, thus enabling the licensee to get possession
of necessary know-how. To alleviate any possible adverse impact on a
business’s honesty and integrity, this immunity could only be triggered at the
time when the right-holder does not faithfully follow the transfer order and hand
over all necessary technical information. The granting authority shall confirm
that disobedience surely exists before issuing the transfer order through a
formal adjudication process.
Such an exemption to the non-disclosure obligation might seem vulnerable
to distortion and abuse, which could be difficult to redress once the trade secret
was revealed. The primary function of the exemption, nevertheless, lies in
deterrence. It is an enforcement measure of last resort, which should be
administered cautiously and conservatively. Countries should not solely rely on
the non-disclosure exemption, but should rather establish other remedies, such
as fines and injunctive relief, to enforce a know-how transfer order. When
those remedies fail and the exemption is granted, the competent authority
should set up adequate rules and procedures to monitor the flow of trade secrets
and prevent possible abuse. If executed appropriately, immunity from any
existing non-disclosure obligation could confidently be a useful enforcement
measure against the right-holder’s resistance.
B. Goal-Attainment Ensuring Orders
In addition to know-how transfer orders, there are still other types of
ancillary orders that would help a compulsory license work effectively towards
its contemplated goal. For those non-voluntary licenses granted on the grounds
of unavailability of affordable drugs to the public, the manufacturer
undertaking the license should be directed to distribute those drugs at an
affordable price, or even provide them for free to especially needy patients.31
In the same vein, in the case of compulsory licenses on the basis of nonexistent
or insufficient local working, the licensee should be required to manufacture
the targeted products within the country and should be restricted from
importing from overseas.32
IV. SIDE-EFFECTS PREVENTING ORDERS
Besides ancillary orders that serve to ensure the effectiveness of
compulsory licensing, there is another type of order that is purported to prevent
31. In re Natco Pharma Ltd. and Bayer Corp., C.L.A. No. 1 of 2011, at 60–61 (Order item a &
h) (Controller of Patents Mar. 9, 2012) (India), available at http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/
compulsory_license_12032012.pdf.
32. Id. at 61 (Order item i).
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adverse side effects to the right-holder. For example, in the 2012 Bayer-Natco
case in India,33 the targeted product Sorafenib was a drug for treatment during
the advanced stages of kidney and liver cancer. Bayer named it Nexavar and
distributed it at a price of Rs.280428 (about US $5404) for one month’s
therapy.34 Natco applied for compulsory licensing and proposed to sell the drug
at one-thirtieth of the price.35 The Indian government approved the application
and required Natco to refrain from both representing its production of Sorafenib
as Bayer’s Nexavar drug, and from representing the two companies as
associated in any aspect.36 Furthermore, Natco’s Sorafenib had to be visibly
different from Bayer’s Nexavar in color, shape, trade name, and outside
packaging.37
Those mandates are quite similar to the special packaging and/or
coloring/shaping requirements as stipulated in TRIPS Article 31bis.38 The
common goals of ancillary orders are to prevent possible confusion of the
licensee’s products with the right-holder’s and to inhibit the pharmaceuticals
manufactured under the license from being diverted into the stream of
commerce outside of the granting country.
Another example of side-effect preventing orders can be found in the Berne
Convention. Article IV(3) of the Appendix of the Berne Convention requires
that copyrighted works translated or reproduced under a compulsory license
have to contain indications of the true author and the title of the work.39 This
requirement protects the author’s moral rights, including the right of attribution
and the right to the integrity of the work, from being impaired. According to
Article 6bis(1) of the Berne Convention, the author’s right of attribution and
the right to integrity of the work shall be independent of the transfer of the
author’s economic rights.40 Consequently, those rights should stay intact even
when the author is facing compulsory licenses.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
art. IV(3).
40.
¶ (1).

Id.
Id. at 5–6; Bonadio, supra note 8, at 721.
In re Natco Pharma Ltd. and Bayer Corp., at 6.
Id. at 61 (Order item k).
Id. at 61–62 (Order item k); see also Bonadio, supra note 8, at 726.
Decisions of the General Council, supra note 14, at Annex, ¶ 2(b)(ii).
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 3, at app.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 4, art. 6bis,
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V. TRIPS-COMPATIBILITY OF ANCILLARY ORDERS
A. Know-How Transfer Orders
The know-how transfer orders described above seem to be an ideal
companion of compulsory licenses. Whether the transfer orders are in
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, however, is somewhat problematic.
Since there is no general exception in the TRIPS Agreement for all types of IP,
a specific exception is necessary for exempting any derogation of IP protection
from the level as required in the same Agreement.41 The first two paragraphs
of Article 39 require WTO members to protect trade secrets, which cover
undisclosed know-how.42 Meanwhile, the same article, and even the same
section of the Agreement, contains no exception to the trade secret protection
it demands. This is not a coincidence. National trade secret laws of WTO
members usually provide few exceptions as well. The United States’ Uniform
Trade Secret Act, for example, contains just one exception.43
The fact that no relevant exception to trade secret protection currently exists
surely casts some doubts on WTO members adopting know-how transfer
orders. But there is another avenue for justifying such orders under the TRIPS
Agreement. In the first sentence of Article 39.1, the TRIPS Agreement
articulates that the purpose of protecting trade secrets is to ensure “effective
protection against unfair competition as provided in Article 10bis of the Paris
Convention (1967).”44 Article 10bis(2) of the Paris Convention defines the act
of unfair competition as “[a]ny act of competition contrary to honest practices
in industrial or commercial matters . . . .”45 The issuance of a compulsory
license, which grants the licensee court-ordered authority to request the rightholder to transfer know-how that is indispensible for fulfilling the license,
should not in itself constitute an act of unfair competition contrary to business
honesty. Compulsory licensing is a well-recognized mechanism to introduce
adequate exploitation of patents or copyright to achieve public interest in
various socioeconomic aspects.46 The licensee here is just an undertaker of
such a legitimate mechanism and does not come into competition with the right-

41. WATAL, supra note 2, at 309.
42. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 39,
¶ 1–2.
43. U.T.S.A. §§ 3(a), 3 cmt. (amended 1985) (The exception excludes from compensation
damages accruing after the trade secret has been revealed or otherwise no longer sustains an advantage
over competitors.).
44. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 39,
¶ 1.
45. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 10bis, ¶ (2), July 14, 1967.
46. World Trade Organization, supra note 5, ¶ 4 & 5(b).
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holder for her own commercial interest. As long as the compulsory license and
ancillary order are based on national laws, granted legally by the authority
concerned, and the licensee faithfully secures the secrecy of the know-how,
there should be no offense to Article 10bis.
Furthermore, laws and measures that compel disclosure of trade secrets
usually do exist outside the trade secret law. Mandatory disclosure is
commonly seen in the fields of corporate auditing and marketing approval.47 In
the TRIPS Agreement, Article 39.3 authorizes WTO members to require
submission of undisclosed test data for the purpose of reviewing the marketing
application of pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products that utilize new
chemical entities, on condition that such data shall be protected against unfair
commercial use.48 The same disclosure requirement is present in the section of
civil and administrative procedures and remedies of the TRIPS Agreement as
well.49 In Article 43.1, the Agreement stipulates that national courts shall have
the authority to order specific evidence, including confidential information, to
be produced by one of the parties, subject to conditions that could ensure the
protection of its secrecy.50 The two provisions comprise part of the treaty
context that must be taken into consideration when interpreting the scope and
content of trade secret protection mandated by the TRIPS Agreement.51
Consequently, the fact that the trade secret law lacks any exceptions does not
indicate that limitations on the trade secret right are prohibited. As long as
adequate measures are adopted to warrant its confidentiality, well-grounded
disclosure orders from other areas of law should be reasonably recognized by
analogy.
The objective clause of the TRIPS Agreement further fortresses the same

47. See e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 669–670 (1984); Allen Ferrell, Measuring the Effects
of Mandated Disclosure, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 369, 371–72 (2004); Trudo Lemmens & Candice
Telfer, Access to Information and the Right to Health: The Human Rights Case for Clinical Trials
Transparency, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 63, 81–91 (2012); Liora Sukhatme, Note, Deterring
Fraud: Mandatory Disclosure and the FDA Drug Approval Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1213–
25 (2007).
48. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 39,
¶ 3.
49. Id. at part 3, § 2.
50. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 43,
¶ 1 (“The judicial authorities shall have the authority, where a party has presented reasonably available
evidence sufficient to support its claims and has specified evidence relevant to substantiation of its
claims which lies in the control of the opposing party, to order that this evidence be produced by the
opposing party, subject in appropriate cases to conditions which ensure the protection of confidential
information.”).
51. See infra text accompanying notes 39–40 (explaining the significance of treaty context in
construing disputed treaty terms).
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position. In Article 7, the Agreement proclaims that the protection of IP rights
should contribute to the transfer and dissemination of technology, “to the
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a
manner conducive to social and economic welfare.”52 Know-how transfer
orders are purported to assist compulsory licensing to balance IP protection and
the socioeconomic welfare of the public. By requiring transfer of critical knowhow, those orders can ensure complete conveyance of all necessary
technologies between IP right-holders and non-voluntary licensees, thus
substantially enhancing the efficacy of technology dissemination that the
compulsory licensing regime is aiming to achieve. Taking all the above
analyses into consideration, know-how transfer orders in effect could not be
sensibly characterized as TRIPS-incompatible.
B. Local Manufacturing Orders
Article 5A(2) and 5A(4) of the Paris Convention (1967) expressly
recognize failure to work a patent and insufficient working as legitimate
grounds for granting compulsory licenses.53 This is often regarded as a local
working requirement imposed on patent owners. In his famous treatise,
Bodenhausen described the prevailing view of the word “working” in the
context of the Paris Convention:
Normally, working a patent will be understood to mean working it
industrially, namely, by manufacture of the patented product, or
industrial application of a patented process. Thus, importation or sale
of the patented article, or of the article manufactured by a patented
process, will not normally be regarded as ‘working’ the patent.54
In 1994, Article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement further incorporated Article 5
of the Paris Convention.55 WTO members would accordingly grant
compulsory licenses for the reason of insufficient domestic working from
patent owners. In order to achieve the goal of local working, the granting
countries might additionally grant an ancillary order that requires the licensees
to manufacture the targeted products domestically and forbids importing.

52. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art.7.
53. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 45, art. 5, ¶ A(2) &
A(4).
54. G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 71 (1969), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/
www/freepublications/en/intproperty/611/wipo_pub_611.pdf.
55. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art.2, ¶
1.
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These types of goal-attainment ensuring orders, however, may be incompatible
with the non-discrimination principle as stipulated in Article 27.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement.56 This clause demands that patent rights shall be enjoyable without
discrimination as to, inter alia, whether products are imported or domestically
produced. A WTO panel once ruled that Article 27.1 applies to Article 31 as
well.57 It follows that the granting authority of compulsory licensing might not
be able to treat patent owners and the licensees in a different way on the basis
of whether the targeted products are imported or locally manufactured.
The idea of non-discrimination and avoiding trade distortion is a
cornerstone of the WTO. The most-favored-nation principle and national
treatment principle, two overarching doctrines throughout the WTO, vindicate
and exemplify the importance of this basic policy.58 Article 27.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement crystallizes and enshrines the same idea in the field of patent law.59
Even though failure to work and insufficient working are explicitly
acknowledged as grounds for compulsory licensing in the TRIPS Agreement,60
the meaning of the terms must be interpreted according to the whole context of
the Agreement, including Article 27.1.
Article 3.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) points out that when disputes arise, the
provisions of WTO agreements will be clarified in accordance with customary
interpretation rules of public international law.61 The WTO Appellate Body
has consistently held that Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT), as a rule of treaty interpretation, has attained the status of
customary international law.62 Article 31.1 of the VCLT states, “A treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
56. Id. at art. 27, ¶ 1.
57. Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 7.91,
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000).
58. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art.
3 (National Treatment) & art. 4 (Most Favored Nation); see, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT
HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 28–30 (3d ed. 2005).
59. Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, supra note 57, ¶
7.94; See also Joseph Straus, Implications of the TRIPs Agreement in the Field of Patent Law, in FROM
GATT TO TRIPS—THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 189–90 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996).
60. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 2, ¶
1; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 45, art. 5, ¶ A(2) & A(4).
61. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3, ¶ 2,
Apr. 15, 1994.
62. E.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996); Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, 10, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996).
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purpose.”63
Even though the requirement of working a patent is understood as a
mandate of local manufacturing in the context of the Paris Convention, it may
slightly change its meaning when migrating into another treaty context. As a
transitive verb with an object, the ordinary meaning of the term “work” may
include to “function,” to “cause to be in operation,”64 or “to fashion or create a
useful or desired product by expending labor or exertion on.”65 The manner in
which local working is proceeding, however, has not been specified. In light
of the non-discrimination principle as to the place of production, to “work” a
patent could and should be construed more broadly as to “practice” a patent. In
this way, the local working requirement can avoid direct collision with the nondiscrimination principle and fit into the new context of the TRIPS Agreement
much more adequately.66
In the U.S.—Copyright Act panel report, a WTO panel held that when
TRIPS provisions are incorporated from other international conventions, their
original contexts in those external instruments could also be integrated into the
Agreement as a basis of interpretation.67 The “acquis” thus introduced from
other international instruments, however, constitutes only part of the context
when interpreting those provisions. The text of the TRIPS Agreement is
undeniably another significant component of the context. For the same reason,
the panel in U.S.—Copyright Act panel report recognized that Article 13 of the
TRIPS Agreement applies to provisions incorporated from the Berne
Convention, though no analogous exception clause to the author’s public
communication right is present in that Convention.68
Professor Carlos Correa has argued that the non-discrimination requirement
of TRIPS Article 27.1 is targeted at infringing products rather than the
patentee’s products.69 He indicates that since the language of Article 27.1 only
states that “patent rights [are] enjoyable without discrimination as to . . .

63. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331, 340,
available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/v1155.pdf (emphasis
added).
AMERICAN
COLLEGE
DICTIONARY
(2002),
available
at
64. OXFORD
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/work?q=work (last visited June 6, 2013).
65. MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1443 (11th ed. 2009), available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/work (last visited June 6, 2013).
66. See also Joseph Straus, supra note 59, at 205.
67. See Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, ¶ 6.92,
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000).
68. Id. ¶ 6.94.
69. Carlos M. Correa, The Use of Compulsory Licenses in Latin America, in COMPULSORY
LICENSING (Reto M. Hilty & Kung-Chung Liu eds., forthcoming 2014).
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whether products are imported or locally produced,”70 the provision could be
interpreted as mandating that inventors shall possess equivalent rights of
patents against infringing products, whether those infringing products are
produced domestically or imported from abroad.71 When the ordinary meaning
of treaty language is vague, even in light of its context, the negotiating history
could be instrumental in ascertaining its true intention.72 During the negotiation
process of the TRIPS Agreement, the local working requirement aroused heated
debates among developed and developing countries.73 The current language of
Article 2.1 and 27.1 marks the compromise that the opposing parties eventually
reached to resolve this deadlock when the negotiations concluded.74 If we
consider for now that the non-discrimination requirement as to the place of
production is for infringing products rather than the patentee’s products, the
negotiating history will be neglected, and the intention of the drafter will be
distorted. Even though Professor Correa refers to the U.S.-Section 337 report
of the GATT era75 to illustrate possible discrimination between infringing
products from importation and local production, the measures at issue in the
same case—border measures that in essence only target imported goods—have
also been expressly recognized in the text of the TRIPS Agreement as
legitimate remedies against IP infringement.76 It is thus unlikely for the
agreement to institute a prohibition in Article 27.1 against such enforcement
measures that are particularly authorized in the same instrument.
According to the analysis above, in light of the non-discrimination principle
in Article 27.1, the local working requirement should not be interpreted as a
local manufacturing requirement. Similarly, ancillary orders to secure local
manufacturing on the side of the licensee may violate the same clause as well.
When insufficient practicing of a specific patent is found, the non-voluntary
licensee should be permitted to import, as well as to produce domestically, the
targeted products to meet the local demand.77
70. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 27,
¶ 1.
71. Correa, supra note 69.
72. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 39, art. 32 (providing for
supplemental means of treaty interpretation, “Recourse may be had to supplementary means of
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning
when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b)
leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”).
73. WATAL, supra note 2, at 317–18.
74. Id. at 318.
75. Panel Report, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439 (Nov. 7, 1989).
76. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, Part
III, § 4 (Special Requirements Related to Border Measures).
77. See generally Bonadio, supra note 7, at 723. But see Bryan Mercurio & Mitali Tyagi,
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Compulsory licensing is a well-recognized regime that strikes a balance
between patent and copyright protection and socioeconomic goals. In order to
make it work effectively, some ancillary measures are necessary. When the
licensee lacks access to critical know-how for practicing the licensed
technology, the granting authority of the compulsory license may require the
right-holder to transfer such know-how to fill the gap. In addition, we might
see the government authority require the licensee to manufacture the targeted
product locally, or to provide the licensed medicine to the public at an
affordable price, so as to ensure the compulsory licensing attains its
contemplated goal.
On the other hand, the granting authority can issue a side-effect averting
order to alleviate unnecessary impact that compulsory licensing may impose on
the right-holder, so that the license does not become too intrusive. Those two
types of ancillary orders are practical complements to non-voluntary licenses,
and could be beneficial for the current regime of compulsory licensing, both
nationally and internationally. They are undoubtedly worthy of consideration
to be incorporated into national laws and international conventions.
The fact that no exception is expressly acknowledged in the trade secret
section of the TRIPS Agreement casts some doubts on the legality of knowhow transfer orders. These doubts are not well founded. Outside of the trade
secret section, the TRIPS Agreement contains at least two provisions
demanding submission of undisclosed information.78 The objective clause of
Article 7 also suggests against incompatibility of those orders with the TRIPS
Agreement.79 On the other hand, orders requiring local manufacturing are
likely to contravene the TRIPS Agreement by violating the non-discrimination
principle between imports and local production in Article 27.1. Even though
the TRIPS Agreement expressly incorporates the local working requirement of
patent owners from the Paris Convention, the meaning of “working” should be
adjusted properly to reflect the change of treaty context, and is reasonably
construed in this Agreement to encompass importation to avoid direct conflict
with Article 27.1.

Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local
Working Requirements, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 275, 313 (2010) (the differential treatment resulting from
local working requirements does not amount to an unjustified disadvantage, and hence is not a
discrimination under Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement).
78. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 39,
¶1 & art. 43, ¶ 1.
79. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 3, art. 7.

